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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Hoppmann wants to address two questions in argumentation theory: whence do 
arguments derive their normative force?, and how can we systematize the critical 
questions we ought to address to arguments? I am particularly interested here in his first 
question, but first I begin with some comments on his attempt at the second question, that 
is, his proposal for organizing the evaluation of arguments. 
 
2. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT EVALUATION 
 
Hoppmann takes a monistic approach to non-demonstrative arguments. That is to say, he 
proceeds on the working hypothesis that one can reduce all defeasible arguments to a 
single set of simple elements organized around a “rule of similarity,” which I’ll call RS 
for short: 
 
(RS) Similar propositions must be ascribed to entities in the same essential 
category. 
 
Such a rule readily lends itself to an analogical approach to argumentation. Thus 
Hoppmann considers analogies the archetype of argument schemes, and their basic 
elements constitute the core of his analysis. That analysis involves the idea that an object 
“possesses a proposition.” At first blush, his term “proposition” seems equivalent to a 
property or perhaps an act of predication. Perhaps we might put it this way: one asserts 
some proposition with respect to some object X, where ‘X’ marks a substitutable 
grammatical role in the proposition—i.e., X is the subject of some assertion, or perhaps 
the direct object, etc., such that one can substitute different objects in the X-position. I 
thus take Hoppmann’s “object” as a very wide category, which can include entities, 
classes of entities, properties, etc.; the X-position ranges accordingly across different 
grammatical alternatives (subject, direct object, modifiers, etc). The “proposition” that 
the object possesses is simply the complete sentence in which the object occurs.  
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 With apologies to formal logicians, we might use ‘p(X)’ as a shorthand for this 
idea. Recalling Hoppmann’s point that arguments involve an audience’s rational transfer 
of assent or belief, we can formulate his analogical scheme as follows: 
 
(1) We believe that p(A). 
(2) Objects A and B are essentially similar. 
(3) Therefore, by (RS) we ought to believe that p(B).  
 
This scheme allows us to develop a set of core critical questions simply by questioning 
the claims in (1) and (2), and the grammatical identity of p(X) across the two 
substitutions. To analyze other types of argument, one simply expands the analogical 
scheme in the appropriate ways, to take account of further elements specific to the type of 
argument. For example, the analysis of arguments from authority must adduce further 
premises that reflect the basis of the authority’s credibility, i.e., whether one assents to 
that authority directly or indirectly.  
 Hoppmann’s project is ambitious, and should it succeed, it would yield a (nearly) 
systematic method of generating critical questions. If I understand his project, it aims to 
uncover something like a core argument scheme, in the sense of an organized set of 
internal propositional relationships that form the inner core around which all arguments 
are built.1 I say his method is “nearly” systematic, however, because as Hoppmann 
himself admits, his analysis “does not guarantee a fully systematic result” (9). In fact, his 
is not the first attempt to reduce non-demonstrative arguments to a single analogical 
structure. John Burbidge (1990) has attempted something similar, but he admits that some 
arguments do not fit. Whether Hoppmann can do better than Burbidge remains to be seen. 
However, a significant worry stands in the way: has Hoppmann mistaken a necessary 
condition of reasoning in general for a core scheme of argument? Hoppmann is no doubt 
right to think that transitions based on similarity relations constitute a necessary element 
of defeasible arguments. Hence it should not be hard to find similarity assumptions in 
many arguments. But I have some doubts that one can turn that necessary condition into a 
core scheme from which one can build up more complex arguments. Three considerations 
motivate my doubt.  
 First, Hoppmann’s analysis of arguments from authority requires a significant 
amount of reconstructive work, based on a particular interpretation of the initial 
argument. I suspect that many argument forms will demand considerable interpretation 
and reformulation before they fit a scheme that centers on RS. If this surmise bears out, 
then one must ask whether Hoppmann’s scheme has not in fact distorted the original 
argument form for the sake of a uniform method, and thereby misunderstood the original 
form. If arguments are to function in everyday contexts, must not those who employ them 
be able to rely on surface relationships as indicative of cogent transitions from accepted 
premises to new conclusions? And must not critical questions respond to such surface 
features?   
                                                 
1 Here I follow van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans, et al. (1996, 18-19), who distinguish 
argumentation structures from argumentation schemes: whereas structures have to do with the “external 
organization” of a set of arguments in support of a conclusion, schemes have to do with “internal 
organization,” i.e., “the principles on which these [individual single] arguments rely in defending the 
standpoint at issue by means of the premises.” 
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 The second consideration has to do with the way Hoppmann’s scheme specifies 
the topic of every argument. His scheme implies that in every argument, the core mode of 
reasoning holds some “proposition” constant across a transition from one object A to 
another object B. This transition is warranted by an essential identity claim along with 
RS. Thus every argument, we might say, is about an extension of some proposition across 
distinct objects. In his example of analogy, the argument extends the proposition ‘it is 
good for country __ to enter the EU’ across the objects Slovenia and Croatia.  
 Many arguments, however, are about a single object and its properties. Consider 
Toulmin’s simple example (1958, 111): Peterson is a Swede, so Peterson is almost 
certainly non-Catholic. Intuitively, the argument makes a transition from one fact about 
Peterson to a further probable fact about him. The constant here is not a proposition or 
predication, but Peterson. To fit this argument into Hoppmann’s scheme, it seems we 
must invert this apparent surface structure. That is, we must regard the proposition as 
‘Peterson is a ___,’ the initial object as ‘Swede,’ and the target object as ‘non-Catholic.’ 
Thus the essential similarity claim is: ‘Swedes and non-Catholics are essentially similar.’ 
This analysis strikes me as changing the intuitive topic of the argument—what we can 
surmise about Peterson’s personal characteristics—to a claim about the association of 
nationality and religion in the case of Peterson. This shift involves a subtle change in 
focus. If we take Hoppmann’s analysis of analogy as a template, then it would have us 
think of Toulmin’s example like this: “Swedish nationality is a property of Peterson, so 
non-Catholicity is almost certainly a property of Peterson.”  
 To be sure, arguments rely heavily on assumptions about similarity across 
transitions. This brings me to the third consideration: as a necessary condition of natural 
argumentation, similarity relationships naturally turn up in argument transitions, possibly 
at more than one point. Thus Toulmin’s well-known scheme involves a number of 
similarity assumptions, but they are not quite the sort that Hoppmann employs. Recall 
that Toulmin analyzes the Peterson argument as follows: ‘Peterson is a Swede’ functions 
as initial data, from which one concludes that Peterson is almost certainly non-Catholic, 
based on the general warrant that ‘a Swede may be taken to be almost certainly non-
Catholic.’ The warrant rests in turn on empirical backing, in this case on statistics 
correlating nationality and religion. The warrant in effect names a similarity relation 
emergent in the backing: Swedes are similar in their religion. The warrant does not say 
that Swedes and non-Catholics are essentially similar, as RS seems to require, but that 
Swedes are similar in a particular respect, namely with respect to not being Catholics. 
Toulmin’s model also assumes a second similarity relationship, namely that Peterson is 
similar to other Swedes. This assumption is given official recognition by the qualifier that 
Toulmin attaches to the conclusion. That qualifier—in this case, ‘almost certainly’—in 
effect says that “the conclusion follows, provided the similarity between Peterson and 
other Swedes is not defeated by a dissimilarity.” 
 The difference between Hoppmann’s analysis and Toulmin’s, then, is this: 
whereas Hoppmann’s scheme centers the argument around an essential similarity claim 
and RS, Toulmin’s scheme builds similarity assumptions into key elements of the model: 
into the warrant, which makes the relevant similarity explicit, and the qualifier, which 
acknowledges that the assumption of similarity between data and warrant is defeasible. If 
similarity assumptions constitute a necessary condition of cogent reasoning in general, 
then it comes as no surprise to find that similarity appears at key transitional points in 
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Toulmin’s model. But that does not mean we can reduce all argument forms to a rule of 
similarity that functions as the universal warrant. Although Toulmin’s warrant names a 
core similarity, that warrant functions not as a single rule that holds for all arguments à la 
RS, but as an empirical induction that depends on context. If a rule like RS is to function 
not only as a necessary condition but also as sufficient for capturing warranted “transfers 
of assent” (as Hoppmann puts it), then it should allow us to track natural argument forms 
without the deep reconstructive work that Hoppmann’s analyses require.   
 
2. THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF ARGUMENTS 
 
I turn now to Hoppmann’s first question, which concerns the grounds of the normative 
force of arguments. Because Hoppmann holds that the rule of similarity (RS) states the 
core warrant for all rational transfers of assent in an argument, he approaches the question 
of normative force as a matter of justifying RS. He proposes that RS is justified insofar as 
arguers want to be treated as persons whose acts display the stability required for 
argumentation (8). The justification might be spelled out as follows:  
 
(1) One can participate as an equal partner in argumentative practices only if 
interlocutors can treat one as a person. 
(2) Interlocutors can treat one as a person only if one acts in a stable and 
consistent manner. 
(3) One acts in a stable and consistent manner only if one follows RS. 
(4) Therefore, one can participate as an equal partner in argumentative practices 
only if one follows RS. 
 
According to the above justification, anyone who wants to participate as an equal partner 
in argumentation must follow RS. Conversely, failure to follow RS can result in loss of 
face and even expulsion from the community of arguers.  
 However, linking this justification with the concept of a person, and in particular 
with the desire to maintain standing (or face) in the community, casts the analysis at a 
very high level of generality. As a result, step (3) in the justification involves an overly 
strong claim about the kind of consistency necessary for the display of personal stability. 
One might soften the claim by tailoring it for argumentation: (3’) the level of personal 
consistency necessary for participation in argumentative practices is achieved only by 
following RS. But (3’) begs the question, simply asserting what the justification set out to 
demonstrate.  
 I therefore suggest an alternative approach to the normative force of arguments. 
This approach is implicit in Hoppmann’s allusions to participation in the “argumentative 
community” (8). To participate in the argumentative community, I take it, is to do 
something together with others, to engage in collective action. But as various social 
philosophers have argued, when a number of individuals intend to act together as a group, 
they incur obligations to one another. To take Margaret Gilbert’s straightforward 
example, if you and I agree to take a walk together, then we commit ourselves to a joint 
action that puts us under a mutual obligation: neither of us may unilaterally break off the 
walk prematurely without explanation or excuse. If one of us does simply split off, say 
after only five minutes, then the other is likely to express pained surprise, 
 4
COMMENTARY ON MICHAEL HOPPMANN 
disappointment, or indignation. The obligation here follows from the joint acceptance of, 
and each party’s commitment to, the collective action (Gilbert 1989). This collective 
action contrasts with a situation in which we simply find ourselves walking in the same 
direction, one or both of us remarks on this fact, and we fall in to walking together. In this 
case, either party remains free to split off without excuse or pardon.  
 According to Raimo Tuomela (2007), collective action presupposes a “group 
ethos,” which at the very least is simply the collectively accepted goal (e.g., taking a walk 
together). More broadly, the group ethos is “the set of constitutive goals, values, beliefs, 
standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions that give the group motivating reasons for 
action” (ibid., p. 16). The group ethos, that is, provides reasons that guide the members’ 
choices and actions in situations in which membership is relevant. In our simple example, 
the goal of taking a walk together provides a reason for each person to stick with it. For 
communities of discourse that involve more elaborate collective practices, such as those 
we find in academia, the group ethos includes a range of goals, values, standards of 
expression, exemplary texts, and norms of proper argumentation. Members must master 
the group ethos in order to gain entry into its argumentative practices. And by mastering 
the ethos and identifying themselves as (new) members of the group, they in effect signal 
their acceptance of the ethos as a source of authoritative reasons that bind them precisely 
as group members. In training to become a chemist, for example, one must master the 
ways in which chemists gather evidence and then deploy that evidence to support 
convincing conclusions. To violate the standards of good chemical arguments incurs 
corrections from other members. To ignore correction incurs more severe sanctions, and 
in the end leads to marginalization or even expulsion from the group. Standards of 
inquiry and argument in chemistry are group reasons that members have collectively 
accepted, and that therefore obligate members to proceed in some ways and not others, 
upon pain of sanction.  
  The analysis of collective action, I propose, provides a more promising avenue 
for understanding the normative force of argument. Rather than grounding normative 
force in personal stability in general, the analysis of collective action focuses more 
precisely on the implications of acting together with others on the basis of a collective 
acceptance of, and commitment to, the group ethos and its obligatory reasons. In a 
nutshell, the analysis focuses on the conditions of stable collective action rather than 
stable personality.  
 The analysis of collective action also opens up interesting lines of further 
research. One of these studies the mix of individualistic and holistic attitudes in groups. 
Here Tuomela makes a fruitful distinction between two fundamental orientations in 
collective action: I-mode and we-mode. In I-mode groups, each individual joins with the 
others for his or her own private reasons. In such groups, each individual retains authority 
over the conditions of his or her participation. Thus the stability of the group ethos, and 
the collective action guided by that ethos, depends on the mere coincidence of private 
reasons. In we-mode groups, individuals act together precisely as group members who 
identify with the group. They thus regulate their choices in the relevant situations 
according to authoritative group reasons, and not merely for individual or private reasons 
that are likely to vary from member to member. Once one has committed oneself to the 
group ethos in a we-mode, its reasons provide categorical grounds for acting in some 
ways and not in others, in the relevant situations.  
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 If argumentative warrants are to have normative force for arguers, then they have 
to function as group reasons, and arguers must form a we-mode group, at least at some 
level, committed to an ethos that includes such warrants. This is not to deny that 
individuals also pursue argumentation for their own personal reasons. The stability of 
argumentative practices, however, depends on a normative framework of discourse that 
supplies group reasons for arguers, reasons that obligate participants precisely because 
they have collectively committed themselves to the cooperative group goal of 
argumentation. But it should not surprise us to find that the mix of personal and group 
reasons can vary according to argumentative practice—along with the kind of warrants 
and level of normative force those warrants command. If Tuomela is right, then the 
stability of argumentation should also vary accordingly. Indeed, the more stable practices 
of argumentation are the more heavily regulated ones, such as those in the natural 
sciences. Everyday argumentation, by contrast, tends to disintegrate much more easily, 
particularly when participants do not belong to some community whose members are 
committed to staying together (e.g., a family). Insofar as the everyday practice of 
argumentation rests on a group ethos that can supply we-mode group reasons, that ethos 
lies in the normative force of coherent language use in general. But that basis apparently 
does not take us very far, apart from some further group context that holds us together in 
a common project. 
 
          Link to paper 
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